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INTERNET CHILD PROTECTION REGISTRY ACTS:
PROTECTING CHILDREN, PARENTS AND...
PORNOGRAPHERS? ALLOWING STATES TO
BALANCE THE FIRST AMENDMENT WITH
PARENTS' RIGHTS TO PRIVACY AND
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE HOME
Samuel D. Castor+
"I have seen more parents who were unable to control themselves than I ever
saw who were unable to control their children." - Brigham Young
l
Since its inception, Internet rowth and innovation has arguably been driven
by the pornography industry. At the same time, laws regulating minors'
access to online pornography are few and far between.
3
As teen Internet access has grown more pervasive,4 parental angst over the
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1. TEACHINGS OF PRESIDENTS OF THE CHURCH: BRIGHAM YOUNG 338 (1997) (citing
Deseret News Semiweekly, July 12, 1870, at 2). Brigham Young served as the territorial governor
of the area that later became the state of Utah, and was the second President of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Id at 1, 9.
2. Peter Johnson, Pornography Drives Technology: Why Not to Censor the Internet, 49
FED. COMM. L.J. 217 (1996) (arguing that the eagerness of pornographers to experiment with new
media has been critical to the growth of the Internet). Online pornographers and Internet
technology experts claim that pornography has driven Internet development, innovation, and
advancement. See Cheryl B. Preston, The Internet And Pornography: What If Congress And the
Supreme Court Had Been Comprised of Techies in 1995-1997?, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REv. 61, 73-
74 (discussing the benefits for the porn industry under the Internet's "no regulatory scheme"
(quoting Jonathan Coopersmith, Does Your Mother Know What You Really Do? The Changing
Nature and Image of Computer-Based Pornography, 22 HIST. & TECH. 1, 2 (2006))).
3. Robert Peters, It Will Take More than Parental Use of Filtering Software to Protect
Children From Internet Pornography, 31 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 829, 831 (2007)
(observing that there are no current laws that can effectively limit a child's access to Internet
pornography).
4. See Amanda Lenhart et al., Teens and Technology: Youth are Leading the Transition to
a Fully Wired and Mobile Nation, at i-vi (2005), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/
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union between pornography and the Internet has risen. 5 This parental fear is
not unfounded; pornographic websites constitute one of the fastest growing
industries on the Internet. Within the last few years, the level of pornographic
material online has exploded exponentially.
7
In addition, pornographic material is nearly ubiquitous and is often available
for free. 8 Pornographers even taret minors by partnering with websites that
offer games to children and teens. As a result, the American Association of
Pediatrics reported that in 2007 alone, forty-two percent of ten-year-olds to
seventeen-year-olds were exposed to Internet pornography.1°  In addition, a
recent study revealed that minors who regularly view adult material are twice
as likely to engage in adolescent sex and become teenage parents.
pdfs/PIPTeensTechJuly2005web.pdf (finding that as of 2005, eighty-seven percent of teens
use the Internet).
5. See Ben Winslow, Anti-Porn Registry Is Defended, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt
Lake City, Utah), June 21, 2006, at B6. Utah House Speaker Greg Curtis is quoted as stating that
Internet "[p]ornography is affecting families in the most base way. It's destroying children as
well as adults." Id.
6. See Betsy Schiffman, Porn Sites Lead Web Growth in December, WIRED, Jan. 12, 2008
http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2008/01/fastest-growing/ ("The five fastest growing web sites in
December 2007 basically boil down to a few key markets, according to Compete.com: porn, pom
and more porn.").
7. Cheryl B. Preston, Making Family-friendly Internet a Reality: The Internet Community
Ports Act, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1471, 1472. "In August of 2005, Internet users viewed over fifteen
billion pages of adult content. This is a positive deluge compared to 1998, during which there
were only fourteen million identified pages of pornography." Id. (citing Internet Pornography,
ENOUGH IS ENOUGH, http://www.enough.org/inside.php?tag=stat%20archives#2 (last visited
Nov. 30, 2009)). In addition, much of the adult content now available online is user-generated,
which complicates the ability to filter illegal content and control underage access. Id. at 1473.
8. Id. at 1472.
9. Sean Barney et al., The Porn Standard: Children and Pornography on the Internet,
THIRD WAY, at 16-18 (July 2005); see also Jane Clifford, Parental Software Is an Aid, Not an
Answer: Filtering, Monitoring Programs Abound, but Best Monitors are Mom and Dad
MSNBC.coM, Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26665698/ns/technologyand.
science-tech andgadgets/ ("'If the kids are under 10, parents better use some type of filtering
and blocking software' because "'[i]f kids are searching for stuff, they end up at porn,
misinformation and criminal sites."').
10. Janis Wolak et al., Unwanted and Wanted Exposure to Online Pornography in a
National Sample of Youth Internet Users, 119 PEDIATRICS 247, 254 (2007).
11. See Anita Chandra et al., Does Watching Sex on Television Predict Teen Pregnancy?
Findings From a National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 122 PEDIATRICS 1047, 1047 (2008)
("Exposure to sexual content on television predicted teen pregnancy .... Teens who were
exposed to high levels of television sexual content (90th percentile) were twice as likely to
experience a pregnancy in the subsequent 3 years, compared with those with lower levels of
exposure (10th percentile)."). The cost of teen pregnancy is not insignificant. Teen pregnancy
cost U.S. taxpayers an average of $7 billion annually and cost $9.1 billion in 2004 alone. Saul D.
Hoffman, By the Numbers: The Public Costs of Teen Childbearing, THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN
TO PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY, 1, 2 (2006), available at http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/
costs/pdf/report/BTNNationalReport.pdf.
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In light of pornography's potentially harmful effects, governments have tried
to give parents tools to shield their children from pornography even before the
Internet existed. 2 Following the inception of the Internet, Congress has passed
several laws to restrict children's access to Internet pornography; however,
most of these laws have been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court. 13 For example, in Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court struck down an
act attempting to prohibit the transmission of obscene communications to
minors over the Internet. 14 Similarly, in Ashcrofi v. ACLU, the Court held that
an act restricting child access to online pornography was unconstitutional.
1 5
One of the few acts to survive a constitutional challenge was the
"Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of
2003" (CAN-SPAM Act)." The CAN-SPAM Act was designed to regulate
unwanted "commercial electronic mail on a nationwide basis, '1 7 but the law
has been denounced by "anti-spam activists" as a failure.' s  Even so, two
proactive states-Michigan and Utah-have taken advantage of the CAN-
SPAM Act's explicit deference to individual "state laws to the extent that those
laws relate to acts of fraud or computer crimes"' 9 to attempt to create an online
12. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-58 (1973). By the start of the
twentieth century, at least thirty states prohibited the sale of obscene material, and by the 1970s
every state had some type of law restricting pornography and erotic material. Id. at 105 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
13. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Childproofing the Internet, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 447, 452-
54, 457-58 (2002) (discussing the Supreme Court's reactions to Congress's attempts to restrict
children from viewing pornographic material).
14. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877-78 (1997) (declaring provisions of the
Communications Decency Act to be a facially overbroad, content-based restriction on speech in
violation of the First Amendment). The Court held the Communications Decency Act was
unconstitutional because it "place[d] an unacceptably heavy burden on protected speech" and
lacked the "sort of 'narrow tailoring' that will save an otherwise patently invalid unconstitutional
provision." Id. at 882. The Court noted that the Communications Decency Act would be saved
from facial overbreadth only by removing the term "or indecent" from the statute. Id. at 882-83.
15. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004) (holding that the Child Online Privacy
Protection Act likely violated the First Amendment because there were plausible, less restrictive
alternatives available to prevent children's access to harmful materials online). The Child Online
Privacy Protection Act was the "second attempt by Congress to make the Internet safe for minors
by criminalizing certain Internet speech," specifically applying to the "knowing poster ... for
commercial purposes' of World Wide Web content that is 'harmful to minors."' Id. at 661.
16. See, e.g., Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of
2003, 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (2006); Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Mummagraphics, Inc., 469 F.3d
348, 356-57 (4th Cir. 2006) (applying the CAN-SPAM Act as enacted).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(1).
18. Daniel Mayer, Attacking a Windmill: Why the CAN SPAMAct is a Futile Waste of Time
and Money, 31 J. LEGIS. 177, 189-90 (2004) (concluding that the CAN-SPAM Act will
ultimately be ineffective); Ken Magill, Stupid Activist Watch: Um, About the Can Spam Act?,
DIRECT, July 22, 2008, http://directmag.com/magillU0722-activists-can-spam-act/ (noting that
Anti-CAN-SPAM Act activists like to call [the Act] the "You Can Spam Act").
19. 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(2)(B) (2006).
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oasis for children and their parents. By creating a Children Protection
Registry (CPR), these states are attempting to protect children from harmful
spam by prohibiting spammers from sending communications to "contact
points" that are registered with the state. 21 CPRs seem to be the most effective
way of sheltering minors from unwanted electronic communications
containing adult material, though the constitutionality of such provisions is
unclear.
22Although Michigan's law has not been challenged, Utah's law was
recently challenged in Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Shurtleff2 3  The Free
Speech Coalition claimed that Utah's CPR violated the First Amendment by
24abridging its freedom of speech. In its ruling on a motion for preliminary
injunction, the district court held that the Free Speech Coalition failed to meet
its burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits and therefore
declined to enjoin the Utah law.25 The court's ruling provides a framework for
arguing that CPRs, such as those created in Utah and Michigan, should survive
a First Amendment challenge.
26
This Comment evaluates states' role in the tug-of-war between governments
attempting to help parents protect children from unwanted, and potentially
harmful, electronic communications and the First Amendment, which prohibits
Congress from abridging a person's freedom of speech. First, this Comment
outlines the law governing regulation of indecent and obscene speech in
general and as it applies to the Internet and electronic communication in
particular. It analyzes the long-standing rationales for protecting children from
20. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1061(2) (West Supp. 2009) (intending "to provide
safeguards to prevent certain messages regarding tobacco, alcohol, pornography, gambling,
illegal drugs, and other illegal products from reaching the minor children of this state"); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 13-39-202 (2006 & Supp. 2008) (prohibiting the sending of communications to
registered contacts if such communications advertise material that minors are prohibited by law
from purchasing, or contain material that is harmful to minors).
21. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1061(2); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-39-202. A "contact
point" is defined as an "electronic identification to which a communication may be sent,
including: (a) an email address; or (b) ... (i) an instant message identity ... ; (ii) a mobile or
other telephone number; (iii) a facsimile number; or (iv) an electronic address .... " UTAH CODE
ANN. § 13-39-102(1); accordMICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1062(a).
22. Jeffrey D. Neuburger, New Media, Technology and the Law: A Summary of Key Legal
Developments Affecting Technology and Emerging Business Models, 978 PLI/PAT 249 (2009);
Robert W. Stocker I1 & Peter J. Kulick, Child Protection Registry Acts: Feel-Good Legislation
Run Amok-With Consequences for the Gaming Industry, II GAMING L. REv. 412, 422 (2007).
23. Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Shurtleff, No. 2:05CV949DAK, 2007 WL 922247 (D. Utah
Mar. 23, 2007).
24. Id. at *2. The Free Speech Coalition "is a trade association that allegedly represents
over 3000 members involved in the production, dissemination, or production of sexually explicit
non-obscene expression." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Id at*17.
26. See id. at *12-17; see also Winslow, supra note 5, at B6 (discussing parents' ability to
protect their children's email addresses from unwanted adult material under the CPR).
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indecent and obscene communications, and then argues that the CAN-SPAM
Act and Utah's and Michigan's CPR Acts demonstrate that state-crafted
legislation is crucial in striking the delicate balance between the First
Amendment rights of those who send the electronic communications
containing adult content and the rights of parents in raising their children-
even if it means shielding minors from some types of speech. In conclusion,
this Comment contends that as electronic communication continues to
proliferate, any federal attempt to help parents prevent unwanted electronic
material from entering their homes should explicitly preserve states' rights to
tailor statutory shields that fit the particular needs and concerns of its citizens.
Just as Utah's and Michigan's CPR Acts enhance the enforcement and
effectiveness of the CAN-SPAM Act, states should be given the opportunity
for their own experimentation.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT: PORNOGRAPHERS VERSUS PARENTS AND
CHILDREN
A. The States 'Right to Regulate Obscenity and Indecency
The authority of states to regulate harmful speech derives from states'
historic police powers. However, in regulating harmful speech, states may
not abridge a person's freedom of speech as protected by the First
Amendment. 8 Regulation that "chills" speech is thus prohibited by the First
Amendment.29  Nor may states regulate interstate commerce, unless given
authorization from Congress.
30
Courts have held that the First Amendment protects the crucial role that free
speech plays in the "market place of ideas" that is essential to democracy.
31
27. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (noting that historic state
police powers include the authority to enforce state regulations on advertising).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech .... ); see De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937). The prohibitions of the First
Amendment are applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See De Jonge, 299 U.S. at 364.
29. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004) (noting that the purpose of applying
the strict scrutiny test to determine whether a "content-based speech restriction" violates the First
Amendment is to "ensure that legitimate speech is not chilled or punished").
30. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The negative implication of
the Commerce Clause, which prohibits states from burdening interstate commerce, applies to
state statutes that regulate the Internet. See Am. Booksellers Found. for Free Expression v.
Strickland, 512 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1099-1105 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (applying a traditional dormant
commerce clause analysis to conclude that a state regulation prohibiting the dissemination of
material harmful to youth over the Internet violated the First Amendment, but did not violate the
Commerce Clause).
31. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Todd
G. Hartman, The Marketplace vs. The Ideas: The First Amendment Challenges to Internet
Commerce, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 427 (1999); see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (recognizing that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
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Specifically, the First Amendment protects speech of value-namely political,
religious, scientific, literary, and artistic speech-in order to maintain a free
exchange of creativity, discourse, and development. 3
2
Though its protections are broad, the First Amendment does not protect all
types of speech from government regulation so long as the regulation is
reasonably related to the unprotected speech it was meant to regulate. 33 The
Court has long recognized that "[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem." 34  For example, because
obscenity is excluded from "the area of protected speech or press" it may be
regulated by a properly tailored statute.35 Child pornography, regardless of
whether it is obscene, is likewise unprotected by the First Amendment.36
Other types of speech given less protection "include the lewd[,] . .. the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by
robust, and wide-open" to combat the potential of government oppression); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("The protection given free speech and press was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people."), overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
32. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34-35 (1973).
33. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); see also Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 381-82 (1957) (holding unconstitutional a Michigan law that
criminalized the sale of "a book containing obscene, immoral, lewd, lascivious language, or
descriptions, tending to incite minors to violent or depraved or immoral acts, manifestly tending
to the corruption of the morals of youth," because the statute was not reasonably restricted to the
type of speech that the state had an interest in regulating).
34. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
35. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 34-35 (holding that "obscene material is not protected by the
First Amendment" and that "such material may be regulated by the states, subject to the specific
safeguards enunciated" by the Court); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 635 (1968) (citing
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)). Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing for the
Court in Miller, concluded that community standards played an integral role in defining obscenity
and that it would be "neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as
requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found
tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City." Miller, 413 U.S. at 33. Further, "equat[ing] the free
and robust exchange of ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene
material demeans the grand conception of the First Amendment and its high purposes in the
historic struggle for freedom. It is a 'misuse of the great guarantees of free speech and free
press."' Id. at 32-34 (quoting Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 645 (1951)).
36. New Yorker v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 750-53, 764-66 (1982) (upholding New York's
ban on using minor children in "sexual performances" as well as the promotion thereof). In
finding the New York statute constitutional, the Court stated that when
a definable class of material, such as that covered by [the New York statute], bears so
heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its production, we think
the balance of competing interests is clearly struck and that it is permissible to consider
these materials as without the protection of the First Amendment.
Id. at 764. Recognizing that almost every state in the United States has enacted laws prohibiting
or combating child pomography, the Court held that a state's interest in protecting the
"physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child ...easily passe[s] muster under the
First Amendment." Id. at 759.
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their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
37 38peace." Because these types of speech lack social value, they are beyond
the First Amendment's protection and may be subjected to government
regulation. 39  Somewhere in between unprotected speech and speech that
receives the full protection of the First Amendment lies commercial speech.4 °
Although the Court has provided clear guidance on the scope of the First
Amendment's protection in the context of protected, unprotected, and
commercial speech, the Court's application of the First Amendment to
indecent speech is an entirely separate matter.
1. The Regulation of Indecent Speech: What Is Indecent?
Merriam-Webster's dictionary defines "indecent" as something that is
"grossly improper or offensive. 'Al The Court's definition is equally nebulous:
"nonconformance with accepted standards of morality." 42 In FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, the Court tied the definition of indecency, at least in the broadcast
medium, to exposing minors to adult content.43 Pacifica involved a father who
complained about an indecent broadcast that he and his minor son heard over
the radio.44 The Court concluded that indecent speech can be partially defined
by the act of broadcasting adult material, as "measured by contemporary
37. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
38. Id. at 572 ("Such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.").
39. Id. at 571-72; see also Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636 (noting that states have the power to
"protect the health, safety, welfare and morals of its community by barring the distribution to
children of books recognized to be suitable for adults").
40. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-63 (1980)
(defining commercial speech as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience" and stating that "[tihe Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection
to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression"). The Court in
Central Hudson set forth a three-prong test that a state statute must satisfy to restrict non-
misleading commercial speech tangential to a lawful activity. Id. at 563. First, the government
must establish a substantial interest in restricting the commercial speech. Id. at 564. Second, the
regulation must "directly advance the state interest," by providing more than "only ineffective or
remote support for the government's purpose." Id. Third, the regulation must be "narrowly
drawn." Id. at 565. The last two factors have been interpreted to "require that there be a
reasonable fit between the government's objectives and the means it chooses to accomplish those
ends." Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228, 1237 (10th Cir. 2004).
41. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 632 (1 1th ed. 2003).
42. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740 (1978).
43. See id at 731-32 ("'[T]he concept of "indecent" is intimately connected with the
exposure of children [to adult material.]"' (quoting 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975))).
44. Id. at 729-30. In addition to tying the definition of indecent speech to the exposure of
children to adult material, the Court further noted that indecent speech is a relative term measured
against "contemporary community standards." Id.
Catholic University Law Review
community standards," when there is a "reasonable risk that children may be in
the audience.
'4 5
However, the government may not, consistent with the First Amendment,
suppress speech "solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a
,46legislative body [deems] unsuitable. Any regulation must recognize that
"only in relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances may government bar
public dissemination of protected materials to [minors]. 'A7  These
circumstances are shaped by the historical rationales for treating
communications directed toward children differently.
48
2. Governmental Reasons to Shield Minors from Indecency
a. Protecting Minors Who Lack the Full Capacity for Individual Choice
The First Amendment was enacted to ensure that individuals, including
children, have the right to engage in the market place of ideas.49 Predicate to
this liberty is the notion that the people participating in the market place are
capable of "individual choice." 5° However, children lack the capacity to
knowingly choose for several reasons.
Primarily, children lack the life experience to make "individual choices. 5 1
The inexperience of minors has been a bedrock rationale for states' interests in
limiting a child's exposure to potentially harmful material, including the
prohibition on the sale of "girlie" magazines to minors,52 the presumption that
adolescent marriages are void,53 and the deeply rooted common law principle
45. Id. at 731-32, 741. Language may be indecent when it focuses on "'sexual or excretory
activities and organs at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in
the audience."' Id. at 732.
46. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975).
47. Id. at212-13.
48. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638-41 (1968).
49. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 213-14. But
see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973) ("[I]n our view, to equate the free and robust
exchange of ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene material demeans
the grand conception of the First Amendment and its high purposes in the historic struggle for
freedom.").
50. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 106-07 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (recognizing that states may sometimes limit
minors' rights because minors generally lack the "experience, perspective and judgment"
necessary to make "important, affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences").
52. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638 ("We do not regard New York's regulation in defining
obscenity on the basis of its appeal to minors under 17 as involving an invasion of such minors'
constitutionally protected freedoms."). In Ginsberg, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
statute that defined obscenity "on the basis of its appeal to minors under 17." Id at 631-33.
53. See, e.g., Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623, 629-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("An age
attainment requirement for marriage is established in every American jurisdiction.").
[Vol. 59:231
2009] Balancing the First Amendment with Parents' Rights to Privacy 239
that contracts entered into by minors are voidable. 54 Children lack the capacity
to make educated decisions and resist, or even recognize, potentially
pernicious offers by profit-seeking adults who make a living by luring children
into addiction to certain products.55 Motivated by the same rationale, Justice
Potter Stewart in his concurrence in Ginsberg v. New York, stated that children
should be treated as a "captive audience," thus giving the government greater
freedom to regulate communications that could reach children.56
Similarly, Justice William Brennan, dissenting in Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, concluded that pornography "imposed upon a person contrary to his
wishes, has all the characteristics of a physical assault [and] constitutes an
invasion of his privacy." 57  Because minors lack the capacity of individual
choice to avoid such an assault, "the State may have a substantial interest in
precluding the flow of obscene materials even to consenting juveniles' 58 in an
effort to ensure that children avoid the harms that they, as children, are unable
to perceive. 59 Similar rationales support a parent's constitutionally protected
right to raise his or her children.
60
54. See Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Pepper, 697 A.2d 1358, 1364 (Md. 1997) ("[G]enerally
speaking, minors may avoid contracts entered into by them with adults under the presumption that
unequal bargaining power always exists between the two, with the power, and therefore, the
potential for overreaching, inuring to the adult."); ERIC MILLS HOLMES, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 9.18 (Joseph Perillo ed., West Publishing Co. 1996) (1950); see also Monumental Bldg. Ass'n
No. 2 v. Herman, 33 Md. 128, 131 (1870) ("By the common law, persons, under the age of
twenty-one years, are not bound by their contracts, except for necessaries .... Infants have this
indulgence from their supposed want of judgment in their transactions with others, and the law
takes this care of them to prevent them from being imposed upon, or overreached by persons of
more years and experience.").
55. An example of pernicious marketing tactics used to ensnare children is the "Joe the
Camel" advertising campaign, which allegedly attracted minors to purchase cigarettes. See
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 558 (2001). The Court in Lorillard cited a Food
and Drug Administration study that "revealed that 72% of 6 year olds and 52% of children ages 3
to 6 recognized 'Joe Camel,' the cartoon anthropomorphic symbol of R. J. Reynolds' Camel
brand cigarettes," and that "[a]fter the introduction of Joe Camel, Camel cigarettes' share of the
youth market rose from 4% to 13%." Id. (citing Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution
of Cigarettes, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,313, 41,333 (1995)).
56. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 649, 650 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart,
concurring, stated that the statute passes constitutional muster because "a child-like someone in
a captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the
presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." Id. at 649-50. Because children lack "full
capacity for individual choice," and because the government may regulate expression that "occurs
in a setting where the capacity to make a choice is absent," the government may regulate speech
that reaches children. Id.
57. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 106-07 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. Id. at 107.
59. See id at 106-07; see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978); Ginsberg,
390 U.S. at 649-50.
60. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) (recognizing the fundamental right of
parents to "make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children").
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b. Preserving Parental Prerogative
Another legitimate state interest is the preservation of parents' prerogatives
in raising their children. 6 1 The Supreme Court has "consistently recognized
that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing
of their children is basic in the structure of our society." 62 Recognizing the
foundational importance of a parents' rights to raise their children, the
Ginsberg Court noted that "parents ... who have this primary responsibility
for children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid
discharge of that responsibility." 63 This deference to parental authority led to
the Court's landmark broadcast indecency case, Pacifica, where the "first blow
theory" was formed.64
c. Protecting Minors from the First Blow
In Pacifica, the Court introduced the principle that a government's authority
to regulate adult material is dependent on the medium used, as well as the age
of the audience. 65 While traditional, tangible materials that a consumer must
purchase-like books, newspapers, and magazines-receive the highest level
of First Amendment protection, broadcast media "receive[s] the most limited
First Amendment protection. 66
The Pacifica Court articulated the "first blow" theory in broadcast
communication because of the pervasiveness of the broadcast medium.
67
Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the Court, referenced the "first blow"
theory in responding to the defendant's argument that anyone wishing to avoid
61. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639 (majority opinion).
62. Id. ("'It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in
the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder."' (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944))); see
also Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that parents have the right
to "direct the upbringing ... of children under their control"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923) (holding that liberty defined the Fourteenth Amendment included the right of parents
to bring up their children).
63. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639.
64. Pacitica, 438 U.S. at 749-50.
65. Id at 747-50. In Pacifica, the FCC evaluated George Carlin's "Filthy Words"
monologue, which described and repeatedly used words that the FCC banned from broadcast. Id.
at 729-3 1. In a subsequent action, the Court evaluated the federal ban on "dial-a-porn" telephone
service. Sable Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 117 (1989). The Court noted that the
"dial-a-pom" service "require[d] the listener to take affirmative steps to receive the
communication" and be willing to pay for the service. Id. at 128. The Court distinguished this
medium from the radio broadcast in Pacifica because, unlike "dial-a-por," radio broadcasts "can
intrude on the privacy of the home without prior warning as to program content, and is 'uniquely
accessible to children, even those too young to read."' Id. at 127 (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at
748-49).
66. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
67. Id at 748-49.
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indecent broadcasts should simply turn off the radio or television. 6 8 The Court
reasoned that requiring the listener to avoid the speech "is like saying that the
remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow." 69 The Court further
reasoned that although "[o]ne may hang up on an indecent phone call,"
exercising "that option does not give the caller a constitutional immunity or
avoid a harm that has already taken place. ' 7° Relying, at least in part, on the
"first blow" doctrine, the Court in Pacifica upheld the FCC's authority to
regulate indecent broadcast content.
71
By parity of reasoning, because the Supreme Court has recognized the
government's interest in protecting children from the "first blow" of indecent
broadcast communication, 72 courts should likewise permit the government to
protect children from similarly unsolicited Internet communications.
However, this seems not to be the case. Instead, the Court appears to have
developed a separate First Amendment standard that applies to Internet-related
communications.
73
B. The Internet and Its Anti-Regulatory Halo
Because the Supreme Court has applied the First Amendment to the Internet
differently than to other media, the Internet seems to have an almost
impenetrable halo of anti-regulatory sanctity. 74  Despite clear authority
supporting the protection of minors from unwanted indecent and obscene
speech, parental rights in raising children, and narrow regulation of certain
indecent content,75 a quick review of laws intended to regulate the Internet
suggests that legislators have failed to enact regulations that do not violate the
First Amendment.
76
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 749.
71. Id. at 748-50. The FCC would take the next several decades testing and refining its
authority to regulate broadcast communications; the most recent challenge to the authority
granted under Pacifica arose in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., in which the Court
evaluated FCC regulation of fleeting expletives- unexpected, live single-occurrence expletives.
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1805 (2009).
72. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
73. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) ("The Internet is 'a unique and wholly
new medium of worldwide human communication."' (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,
844 (E.D. Pa. 1996))).
74. See Hartman, supra note 31, at 426-27 ("Specifically, courts considering the First
Amendment characteristics of the Internet have advanced to a 'marketplace of ideas' theory of
First Amendment jurisprudence, a theory which has a much broader reach than that applied to any
other media.").
75. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003); Reno, 521 U.S. at
886-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
76. See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S. at 885 (majority opinion) (holding that the Communications
Decency Act violated the First Amendment because it was facially overbroad).
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Similarly, the Internet has been free from other types of federal regulation-
federal taxation, for example. 77 This general hands-off-the-Internet approach
was intended to ensure that the Internet thrived and increased interstate and
international commerce without legislative interference.78 But this has not
stopped the federal and state governments from trying.
79
1. Federal Regulation of the Internet: A Judicial and Congressional Tug-of-
War
In 1996, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act (CDA) to
protect children from harmful online content.80 The CDA criminalized the
knowing transmission, "by means of a telecommunication device," of a
"communication which is obscene ... knowing the recipient is under 18 years
of age. ' 81  The CDA also criminalized computer-assisted transmission or
display of material that depicted or described, "in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities
or organs.' 82 Violators of the CDA faced up to two years in prison for each
violation.83 In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court held that the CDA was
unconstitutionally overbroad, and it survived only after severing its prohibition
of indecent material.84
Justice Stevens, who limited protection for indecent speech in Pacifica,8 5
also authored the Court's decision in Reno, holding that the CDA violated the
First Amendment of the Constitution. 86 Specifically, the Court held that the
CDA was too vague and chilled protected free speech.87 In addition, the Court
denied the government's contention that the law was essentially a time, place,
77. Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1100, 1201, 1203, 112 Stat. 2681,
2681-2719, 2726, 2727 (1998).
78. See id. § 1203(b).
79. Matthew B. Prince & Patrick A. Shea, After Can-Span, How States Can Stay Relevant
in the Fight Against Unwanted Messages, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 29, 29
(2003) ("Beginning with Nevada, one by one across the country state after state drafted and
passed laws designed to beat back the rising tide of unsolicited electronic mail."). By 2003,
thirty-six states had tried and failed at passing laws that regulate the transmission of spare via the
Internet. See id. at 29-3 1. For a review of these attempts and commentary on the reasons for
failure, see id. at 33-53.
80. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006); see also Reno, 521
U.S. at 885.
81. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a).
82. Reno, 521 U.S. at 860 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1994 ed., Supp. 11)).
83. 47 U.S.C. § 223(d).
84. Reno, 521 U.S. at 883.
85. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978).
86. Reno, 521 U.S. at 849, 885.
87. Id. at 870-72.
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and manner---or "cyberzoning"-regulation of the Internet. 88 Justice Stevens
also noted that "users seldom encounter such content accidentally" and that
"[a]lmost all sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings as to the
content"; thus "the 'odds are slim' that a user would enter a sexually explicit
site by accident."
89
For those reasons, the Court held that the CDA's prohibition of "patently
offensive" or "indecent" communications to minors through
telecommunications devices was an overly broad, content-based regulation of
speech.90 The Court highlighted the CDA's overbreadth by noting that a
mother could be prosecuted under the CDA for allowing her child to "to obtain
information on the Internet that she, in her parental judgment, deem[ed]
appropriate." 91
Shortly after the CDA was declared unconstitutional-and in response to the
deficiencies in the CDA enumerated by the Court-Congress enacted the Child
Online Protection Act (COPA)." COPA prohibited knowingly making
commercial, adult material "available to any minor . . . [including] material
that is harmful to minors."93 This crime was punishable by a fine of $50,000
and six months in prison.94  The Act defined "material that is harmful to
minors" as that which "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, would find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to
minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to the prurient
interest. '95  More specifically, prohibited harmful material under COPA
included commercial communications to minors depicting "actual or simulated
sexual act[s] or sexual contact ... or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-
88. Id. at 867-68 ("The CDA is a content-based blanket restriction on speech and, as such,
cannot be 'properly analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation."' (quoting Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46 (1986))).
89. Id at 854 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844-45 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). "Unlike
communications received by radio or television, 'the receipt of information on the Internet
requires a series of affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely turning a dial. A
child requires some sophistication and some ability to read to retrieve material and thereby to use
the Internet unattended."' Id. (quoting Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 845).
90. See id. at 877-78. The Court reasoned that because "the CDA applies broadly to the
entire universe of cyberspace," and its "purpose ... is to protect children from the primary effects
of 'indecent' and 'patently offensive' speech, rather than any 'secondary' effect of such speech,"
that it was essentially "a content-based blanket restriction on speech." Id. at 868. Accordingly,
the CDA could not "be 'properly analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation."' Id.
(quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46 (1996)).
91. Id.at878.
92. Child Online Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-2736
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2006)). "COPA is the second attempt by Congress to make the
Internet safe for minors by criminalizing certain Internet speech. The first attempt was the
Communications Decency Act of 1996." Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004).
93. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (2006).
94. Id.
95. Id. § 231(e)(6)(A).
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pubescent female breast. COPA also prohibited material that, "taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors."
97
COPA, like the CDA, was declared unconstitutional.9 8 In Ashcroft v. ACLU,
the Court stated that COPA likely violated the First Amendment. 99 Although
Congress could criminalize harmful commercial Internet content and require
age verification upon threat of prosecution, ultimately the government failed to
address the contention that filtering software was a less restrictive means of
protecting children from harmful online content.'
0 0
Even though the Court affirmed the Third Circuit's injunction, finding that
COPA was likely unconstitutional,' 0 1 and ultimately sealed COPA's fate by
declining to grant certiorari to the Third Circuit's decision declaring it
unconstitutional, 102 the Court expressly reminded the lower courts and the
government that Congress was not "incapable of enacting any regulation of the
Internet designed to prevent minors from gaining access to harmful
materials. ' 1° 3 Rather, the Court explained, Congress must be careful when
enacting "[c]ontent-based prohibitions, enforced by severe criminal penalties,
[which] have the constant potential to be a repressive force in the lives and
thoughts of a free people."
'1°4
More recent efforts to regulate electronic communications to minors have
proven equally ineffective, including an attempt to create a ".xxx" domain
name, hailed as a technological solution that would essentially sequester
pornographic material to one corner of the Internet.10 5 Other proposals have
included establishing an entirely separate Internet for adult content.'
0 6
However, neither of these efforts brought about any results1 0 7
96. Id. § 231(e)(6)(B).
97. Id. § 231(e)(6)(C), This allowance for speech with value is Congress's attempt to
conform the statute to the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. See Miller v.
California,413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
98. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 666-67. Ultimately, the Court reasoned that practical considerations, such as the
evolving nature of the Internet and filtering technologies, and the "serious chill" posed by COPA
upon protected speech justified an injunction against its enforcement. Id. at 670-72.
101. Id. at660-61.
102. Mukasey v. ACLU, 129 S. Ct. 1032 (2009) (denying certiorari).
103. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 672.
104. Id. at 660 ("[T]he Constitution demands that content-based restrictions on speech be
presumed invalid, and that the Government bear the burden of showing their constitutionality."
(citations omitted)).
105. See Free Speech Coalition, Official FSC position on .XXX, Feb. 8, 2008,
http://web.archive.org/web/20080208115049/http://www.freespeechcoalition.com/FSCView.asp?
action=preview&coid= 138#history.
106. See CP80 Foundation, http://www.cp80.org/legislation (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). The
CP80 Foundation supports "carefully crafted and constitutionally sound legislation" protecting
children from Internet pornography. Id. This includes the "Internet Community Ports Act,"
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2. The CAN-SPAM A CT: An Email-Only Solution
One of the few federal laws to pass constitutional muster has been the CAN-
SPAM Act.' The Act was designed to fight pernicious marketing and
pornographic spam. 09
In general, the CAN-SPAM Act and subsequent Federal Trade Commission
regulations place restrictions on distributors of electronic mass-mailings.
110
Specifically, the implementation of the Act prohibits predatory and abusive
email,111 targets deceptive subject lines, 112 requires that email headings identify
messages that contain sexually oriented materials," 3 mandates free-of-cost opt-
out features, 11 4 requires that all emails have functioning return addresses,
and prohibits explicit material from being instantly displayed when an email is
opened.!6 The CAN-SPAM Act is different than its unconstitutional brothers
because it targets commercial speech.' 1
7
In addition to its various straightforward prohibitions, the CAN-SPAM Act
allowed for the creation of a federal "do-not-e-mail registry," and required the
FTC to submit to Congress a plan for implementing such a registry before
actual implementation.' However, the FTC declined to implement the
registry because it had "serious concerns about the security and privacy risks
inherent in any type of do-not-email registry."'119 Specifically, the FTC stated
in its June 2004 report to Congress "that any Do Not Email registry that
earmarked particular email addresses as belonging to or used by children
would raise very grave concerns," including the possibility that "the Internet's
most dangerous users, including pedophiles" could gain access to the email
which sets up child-safe community ports and would criminalize adult-content accessible service
on the community ports. Id.
107. See id.; Press Release, Internet Corporation for Names and Numbers, ICANN Board
Votes Against XXX Sponsored Top Level Domain Agreement (May 10, 2006),
http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement- 1OmayO6.htm.
108. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, 15
U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713 (2006).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a), (b).
110. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7703-7704; see also 16 C.F.R. § 316.3-.4 (2006).
111. 15U.S.C.§7703.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 7704(c)(2).
113. 16 C.F.R. § 316.5.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 7704(d)(1).
117. See 15 U.S.C. § 7703; see also Aitken v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 496 F. Supp. 2d
653, 662-66 (E.D. Va. 2007) (noting that under CAN-SPAM, "an email is subject to regulation
by the Act only if it is commercial speech within the meaning of the First Amendment").
118. 15U.S.C.§7708.
119. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, EFFECTIVENESS AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE CAN-SPAM
ACT, 40-41 (2005), available at http://www.flc.gov/reports/canspam05/051220canspamrpt.pdf.
[hereinafter FED. TRADE COMM'N, EFFECTIVENESS AND ENFORCEMENT].
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information; a risk the FTC considered "truly chilling."' 120 Instead, the FTC
recommended: (1) "continued vigorous enforcement of the civil and criminal
provisions of CAN-SPAM;" (2) "passage of US SAFE WEB Act to strengthen
the Commission's ability to pursue pornographic spammers who exploit
international barriers to evade prosecution;" and (3) "redoubled efforts to
educate consumers about available technologies to protect children from
viewing sexually explicit spam."'
121
Most importantly, the CAN-SPAM Act also expressly deferred to state
common law or state statutes that regulate deceptive electronic
communications, allowing states to tailor their enforcement scheme to meet
their citizens' needs. 122 It is this anti-preemption loophole that allows states to
independently regulate deceptive electronic communications and other
computer crimes. As discussed below, Utah and Michigan used the CAN-
SPAM Act's non-preemption provision as the springboard for their own pieces
of home-grown child-protection legislation.
123
C. Utah and Michigan CPRs: Courageous States Experiment
On August 15, 2005, Utah became the second state in the nation to introduce
a law designed to protect children from pornographic email.124 Telling parents
to think of the CPR as "a do-not-call list" for email, Utah Attorney General
Mark Shurtleff assured parents that the law would give "parents the ability to
say 'do not send porn to my children.' 125 The Utah Child Protection Registry
Act was passed by the Utah Legislature and signed into law by the Utah
Governor on May 1, 2006.126 Parents quickly began to sign up for the
registry, 127 and litigation immediately ensued.
128
120. FED. TRADE COMM'N, NATIONAL Do NOT EMAIL REGISTRY: A REPORT TO CONGRESS
34 (2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/dneregistry/report.pdf. [hereinafter FED.
TRADE COMM'N, NATIONAL Do NOT EMAIL REGISTRY]. The FTC later stated in a 2005 report:
"In the year and a half since the Commission issued that report, there have been no technological
advances that would alleviate the risk that pedophiles and spammers would misuse registry data."
FED. TRADE COMM'N, EFFECTIVENESS AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 119, at 40 n. 164 (internal
citations omitted).
121. FED. TRADE COMM'N, EFFECTIVENESS AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 119, at 41.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b) (providing that the CAN-SPAM Act does not preempt (1) "any
[state] statute, regulation, or rule [that] prohibits falsity or deception in any portion of a
commercial electronic mail message or information attached thereto"; (2) "state laws that are not
specific to electronic mail, including State trespass, contract, or tort law"; or (3) "other State laws
to the extent that those laws relate to acts of fraud or computer crime").
123. Geoffrey Fattah, Utah Aims to Stop Porn E-mail to Kids, Child Protection Registry Is
Similar to the Do-Not-Call List, DESERET MORNING NEWS, July 20, 2005 at B5 ("Utah's Child
Protection Registry, www.kidsregistry.utah.gov, went online last Friday.").
124. See Stocker & Kulick, supra note 22, at 412 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
752.1061-. 1068 and UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-39-101-304); Fattah, supra note 123, at B5.
125. Fattah, supra note 123, at B5.
126. 2006 Utah Laws 1667 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-39-202).
127. Winslow, supra note 5, at B6.
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1. A Brief Synopsis of the CPR Acts in Utah and Michigan
The Utah Child Protection Act extends Utah's longstanding prohibitions on
marketing or selling adult material or products to children. 12 9 Specifically, it
prohibited a third party from advertising "a product or service that a minor is
prohibited by law from purchasing," or sending an advertisement that
"contains or advertises material that is harmful to minors," by means of
electronic communication to an email address on the CPR. 130 The prohibition
includes marketing alcohol, tobacco products, and pornographic materials,
among others. 13 1  However, what began as an email "do-not-call list
132
eventually grew into a "do-not-contact list" for several types of electronic
solicitation.
13 3
In its present form, the CPR threatens non-compliant spammers with fines
and criminal prosecution if they "send or cause to be sent ... a communication
to a contact point or domain that has been registered for more than 30 calendar
days with the division" if the "primary purpose" of the communication is the
"advertising or promoting [of] a product or service that a minor is prohibited
by law from purchasing."'1 34 The statute also prohibits sending a message that
"contains or has the primary purpose of advertising or promoting material that
is harmful to minors."
' 135
Moreover, having a minor's consent is not a defense for violations of the
statute.' 36 Internet Service Providers, however, are not subject to prosecution
under the statute where they "solely transmit[] a message across [their]
128. See Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Shurtleff, No. 2:05CV949DAK, 2007 WL 922247, at *1
(D. Utah Mar. 23, 2007).
129. 2004 Utah Laws 1593 (prohibiting the sending of certain materials to contact points
registered with the child protection registry); see also 1973 Utah Laws 680 (originally enacting
section 76-10-1206 of the Utah Criminal Code prohibiting the production and distribution of
materials harmful to minors).
130. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-39-202(1) (2005 & 2008 Supp.).
131. Shurtleff, 2007 WL 922247, at *6.
132. Fattah, supra note 123, at B5.
133. See Peter Nagy, Measure to Expand Child-Data Registry, DESERET MORNING NEWS,
Feb. 11, 2006, at B4.
134. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-39-202(1)(a).
135. Id. § 13-39-202(l)(b). Content "harmful to minors" is defined as:
that quality of any description or representation, in whatsoever form, of nudity, sexual
conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse when it:
(i) taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex of minors;
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole
with respect to what is suitable material for minors; and
(iii) taken as a whole, does not have serious value for minors.
(b) Serious value includes only serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value for
minors.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1201(5)(a)-(b) (2005 & Supp. 2008).
136. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-39-202(2).
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network., 137 Once a contact point is placed on the protection registry list, "an
adult who controls the contact point" may opt out of the registry at a later date
if they so choose.
138
To comply with the law, distributors and marketers must scrub their contact
lists before sending covered communications, removing the contact
information of those individuals registered with the CPR. To do so,
marketers may contract with Unspam, a national, nonprofit organization that
has access to the registry and offers to scrub email lists for half a cent per
contact. 140
Utah's CPR came under fire when the Free Speech Coalition (Coalition)
challenged the constitutionality of the CPR Act. 4  The Coalition claimed,
inter alia, that the CAN-SPAM Act preempted Utah's statute and violated the
First Amendment.1
42
D. The Utah District Court's Analysis of the CPR Act
Although no court has ruled on the constitutionality of Utah's CPR Act on
the merits, the district court in Shurtleff extensively examined the
constitutionality of the Act when it ruled on the Free Speech Coalition's
motion for preliminary injunction. 143  Although not an entirely dispositive
decision, the court's rationale for denying the injunction underscored the
benefits of allowing states to participate in the delicate task of regulating the
137. Id. § 13-39-202(3).
138. Id. § 13-39-202(4). The law requires those who
propose[] to send a communication [covered by the Act to] . . . verify the age of the
adult who controls the contact point by inspecting the adult's government-issued
identification card in a face-to-face transaction [and to] . . . obtain a written record
indicating the adult's consent that is signed by the adult.
Id. § 13-39-202(4)(b).
139. See id. § 13-39-202(4).
140. Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Shurtleff, No. 2:05CV949DAK, 2007 WL 922247, at *1 (D.
Utah Mar. 23, 2007); see also Unspam Technologies, Inc., http://www.unspam.com/ (last visited
Nov. 30, 2009).
141. See Shurtleff, 2007 WL 922247, at *6. The Free Speech Coalition is the adult
entertainment industry's trade association whose mission includes serving as the "legislative
watchdog for the industry" and, when necessary, litigating to protect against unconstitutional
government intervention. Free Speech Coalition Mission Statement, http://www.freespeech
coalition.com/missionstatementaboutus.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). The Coalition posts a
newsletter and various trade show and product advertisements on its website. Shurtleff, 2007 WL
922247, at *1-3. The electronic newsletter, entitled Free Speech X-Press, "from time to time ...
reports on matters that may be unsuitable for consideration by minors." Id.
142. Shurtleff, 2007 WL 922247, at *6. In response, the Utah Attorney General was quick to
claim that the lawsuit revealed the pornographers' true colors. See Shurtleff Seeks to Dismiss
Group's Pro-Porn Lawsuit, DESERET MoRNINci NEWS, Dec. 8, 2005, at B2. The Attorney
General responded to the suit by stating that "[pornographers] claim a 'right' to market porn to
adults, but by challenging our Child Protection Registry, they have proven their real intent to
force smut on our children in our homes and schools." See Shurtleff 2007 WL 922247, at *6.
143. Shurtleff, 2007 WL 922247, at *9-10.
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Internet. 44 Specifically, when addressing the preemption question, the court
noted Congress's deference to states' "historic police powers"-particularly
the power to protect parents' prerogatives to raise their children. 
45
The court reasoned that Congress expressly left room for states to regulate
"computer crimes[, which] appear[ed] to be a recognition of the states'
traditional police powers."'6 The court further emphasized the important role
of state regulation, and states' power to regulate, by noting that "'the States
retain authority under their general police powers to regulate matters of
"legitimate local concern," even though interstate commerce may be
affected. "1
47
The district court cited the Supreme Court's reasoning in Ginsberg v. New
York in holding that the "CPR is presumptively a proper exercise of Utah's
police powers" because of the "state's interest in safeguarding parents' right
'to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children[,
which] is basic in the structure of society. ' 148 Thus, the court concluded that
"the CPR fits within an express exemption to preemption contained in CAN-
SPAM... [and] that the CPR is not in conflict with the Federal legislation.'
' 49
The district court subsequently addressed the Free Speech Coalition's
likelihood of success on its First Amendment challenge to the CPR Act.
50
Again, the court focused on the role of traditional state police powers, the
general and deeply rooted right of parents' plenary authority in their own
home, and the limited value and protection unwanted adult speech should be
afforded.15  The court concluded that the CPR merely assisted parents in
keeping unwanted electronic communications out of their homes, which does
not violate the First Amendment because it only aids "citizens [in]
control[ling] what speech enters their private domain."
The court also noted that the information sent to emails and other contact
points protected by the CPR triggered the "captive-audience problem"
144. Id.
145. Id. at *8-10.
146. Id. at *10.
147. Id. at * 11 (quoting Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980)).
148. Id. at *9 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 636, 639 (1968)). The court also
acknowledged the Supreme Court's holding, which stated that the "'liberty interest... of parents
in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . [is] perhaps the oldest recognized by [the]
Court."' Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (affirming the presumption that
parents act in the best interest of their children and therefore enjoy the right to raise their own
children)).
149. Id. at*10.
150. Id. at*12-16.
151. Id.
152. Id. at * 13 (noting the important "right of citizens to avoid unwanted communication,
even in cases involving core political speech, as part of citizens' broader right to be left alone"
(citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716-17 (2000))).
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discussed in Pacifica,153 which occurs when a person exercises his or her right
to free speech at a time or in a place where the recipient is unable to avoid the
unexpected offense of the speech.154  Because "captive-audience" speech is
unwanted, there is no unconstitutional "chilling effect."' 55 For example, as the
Supreme Court noted in Rowan v. US. Post Office Department, "a mailer's
right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of the unreceptive
addressee.",
156
Ultimately, the court found that Utah's CPR should not be preliminarily
enjoined. In so doing, it noted that Utah's CPR is likely an example of a
non-preempted, valid enactment pursuant to state authority--demonstrating a
state's ability to shield parents and children from unwanted electronic,
pornographic solicitations while simultaneously sustaining the First
Amendment rights of pornographers.1
58
II. STATES HAVE BEEN UNNECESSARILY LIMITED IN THEIR AUTHORITY TO
REGULATE ONLINE CONTENT
Both Utah's and Michigan's CPRs provide a solution for protecting minors
from unsolicited harmful electronic content; however, it is a limited one.
These laws are constrained by the First Amendment's limitations on a state's
power to regulate indecency as articulated by the Supreme Court in Miller v.
153. See FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 & n.27 (1978).
154. Shurtleff, 2007 WL 922247, at *14. The court was also quick to note that "the State's
interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the
highest order in a free and civilized society." Id. (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484
(1988)).
155. Id. (citing Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970)); see also Frisby, 487
U.S. at 484-85 ("[W]e have repeatedly held that individuals are not required to welcome
unwanted speech into their own homes and that the government may protect this freedom."). The
district court also reminded the Coalition that "no one has a right to press even 'good' ideas on an
unwilling recipient." Shurtleff, 2007 WL 922247, at *14 (citing Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738). In
Rowan, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Title III of the Postal Revenue and
Federal Salary Act of 1967. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 729, 738. Under the Act, a person may require
the removal of his name from a mailer's mailing list and stop future mailings, similar to the set-up
under Utah's CPR Act. Id. at 729. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
has also held that, when dealing with speech usually entitled to strict scrutiny protection, but
when the regulation contains an opt-in provision, the court "need only determine that the State's
interest in maintaining residential privacy for ... citizens [that] outweighs the speaker's right to
communicate his or her message into private homes. Nat'l Coal. of Prayer, Inc. v. Carter, 455
F.3d 787, 787-88 (7th Cir. 2006).
156. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736-37 ("To hold less would tend to license a form of trespass and
would make hardly more sense than to say that a radio or television viewer may not twist the dial
to cut off an offensive or boring communication and thus bar its entering his home.").
157. Shurtleff,2007WL922247,at*18-19.
158. Id. at *8-19 ("Accordingly, based on the above reasoning, Plaintiff has not met its
burden that it will likely succeed on any of its challenges to the CPR.").
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California159 and commercial speech as set forth in Central Hudson Gas and• • 160
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission. Consequently, Michigan's
and Utah's CPRs slavishly pay jurisprudential homage to the CAN-SPAM Act
and the Court's precedential "e .' 61
Although both laws exemplify states' abilities to appropriately balance the
fundamental rights of parents to raise their children with the First Amendment
rights of pornographers, the Court's interpretation of the First Amendment's
application to the Intemet has limited states' power to vindicate its deeply
rooted interest in protecting parental rights-specifically the right to prevent
their children from exposure to harmful material. Furthermore, the Court's
1997 perception of the Intemet in Reno 162 is now outdated and both inhibits
states' ability to experiment with ways to protect their citizens and overlooks
the impact of changing communications technology.
A. Federal Precedent Fails to Give Sufficient Deference to the States 'Right to
Protect Parental Prerogative
The Supreme Court has consistently and emphatically declared that parental
authority is integral to the foundation of society. 163  Despite this clear
precedent upholding the states' right to protect parental authority in the
159. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1973) ("Sex and nudity may not be
exploited without limit by films or pictures exhibited or sold in places of public accommodation
any more than live sex and nudity can be exhibited or sold without limit in such public places. At
a minimum, prurient, patently offensive depiction or description of sexual conduct must have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value to merit First Amendment protection.").
160. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980).
Central Hudson considered governmental regulation of commercial speech in the context of a
state law prohibiting an electrical utility from promotional advertising because the state promoted
conservation of fuels. Id. at 558-59. In its opinion, the Court created a four-part test to analyze
the constitutionality of governmental regulation of commercial speech, ultimately finding the
state's law unconstitutional because alternative methods existed to attain the state's goal without
such a harsh restriction on speech. Id. at 571-72.
161. Shurtleff, 2007 WL 922247, at * 15 (holding that CAN-SPAM does not preempt Utah
CPR, nor is the Utah statute a prior restraint, unconstitutionally vague, or insufficient under
Central Hudson); see also Laura Dunlop, Don't Send That E-Mail to a Minor!: Compliance with
State Child Protection Registry Statutes, 3 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 4, 7 (2006) (describing
similarities between Utah and Michigan CPR statutes).
162. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 846, 877 (1997) (affirming the district court's finding that
"currently available user-based software suggests that a reasonably effective method by which
parents can prevent their children from accessing material which [the] parents believe is
inappropriate ... will soon be widely available").
163. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. And it is in
recognition of this that [our] decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter."); see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) ("[T]he parents'
claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the
structure of our society.").
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home, 164 the courts have sacrificed the vitality of parental autonomy for the
vitality of the Internet. 165  Moreover, the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence in the Internet context is based on a misunderstanding of the
technology. For example, Justice Stevens stated in Reno that parental authority
was not circumvented because the availability of "user-based software
suggests that a reasonably effective method by which parents can prevent their
children from accessing sexually explicit and other material which parents
believe is inappropriate will soon be widely available.' ' 66  However, such
child-proof software has yet to be produced. 67 Without such software, the
burden of protecting children falls entirely on the shoulders of the parents who
lack any effective tool to prevent their children from seeing unsolicited
electronic communications that contain material harmful to minors-short of
turning off the computer altogether. This approach seems to conflict with the
protections advocated under the "first blow" theory by Justice Stevens in
Pacifica.168 This is especially true considering children's ability to circumvent
their parents' best efforts by manipulating technology.
B. Children Have the Capacity to Use the Internet but Lack the Wisdom to
Avoid Its Harms
Children know how to use the Internet.169 In fact, the percentage of children
170Internet users outpaces adult rates of usage by twenty percent. Justice
Stevens overlooked children's lack of self-control and their unchecked
curiosity when he relied on the district court's conclusions in Reno that "users
seldom encounter such content accidentally," and that because "[a]lmost all
sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings as to the content . . . the
'odds are slim' that a user would enter a sexually explicit site by accident."' 171
Indeed, if children want to find pornography online, they can find it with little
164. See, e.g., Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639.
165. The Court's deference to Internet speech over states' interest in giving parents the tools
to protect their children from unsolicited electronic communications is clear. See supra Parts
I.A.2.b-c.
166. Reno, 521 U.S. at 877.
167. See Stephanie Olsen, Kids Outsmart Web Filters, CNET NEWS.COM, Apr. 19, 2006,
http://news.cnet.com/2009-1041_3-6062548.html.
168. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
169. See Lenhart et al., supra note 4, at i-ii.
170. Id.
171. Reno, 521 U.S. at 854. Justice Stevens further noted that unlike communications
received by radio or television, "the receipt of information on the Internet requires a series of
affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely turning a dial. A child requires some
sophistication and some ability to read to retrieve material and thereby to use the Internet
unattended." Id; see also Marketing to Children: Trillion Dollar Kids, ECONOMIST, Dec. 2,
2006, at 66 ("Children are hedonists, inclined to make impulse buys and less likely to make
educated purchasing decisions.").
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effort.172  For example, Intemet-savvy children can easily circumvent "safe
search" option on Internet search engines by simply viewing thumbnail images
of the inappropriate material.'
73
More importantly, a child's exposure to adult material can also occur
accidentally. Even if parents want to "protect[] younger children by limiting
their online activities to 'fenced play yards,"' they likely lack the capacity to
erect and monitor the fences. 174  Without effective parental supervision,
children are likely to stumble "into unsavory electronic neighborhoods,"'
' 75
where adults might intentionally use the allure of adult images, even cartoons,
to entrap children into addictive product consumption. 76 For these reasons,
the Supreme Court should revisit its holding in Reno and the First Amendment
application to unsolicited electronic communications.
III. ALLOWING STATES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS WILL INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FEDERAL LAWS
Utah's CPR Act demonstrates that states play an important role in the future
of Internet and electronic communication regulation. The CAN-SPAM Act
recognized that "[t]he problems associated with the rapid growth and abuse of
unsolicited commercial electronic mail cannot be solved by Federal legislation
alone."'177 This recognition of federal inadequacy indicates that states must
play a more active role in solving the "abuse of unsolicited commercial
electronic mail," even if the resulting regulatory scheme is not entirely
uniform.'
78
State involvement, through enactment of CPRs, can provide future
legislators with greater objective experience in determining the appropriate
level of state involvement in creating a nationwide Internet regulatory
172. See Olsen, supra note 167.
173. Id. ("Teens also trick filters by typing in misspelled words or modem slang to retrieve
links to racy material. Translation sites Babelfish or Google Translate can deliver sites like
Playboy.com translated from another language. 'It's going to be the constant battle. No matter
what you put up, kids are going to work around it,' said Lynn Beebe, a school counselor in Scotts
Valley, Calif ... [T]here's no foolproof solution .... A more popular avenue for teens on
school PCs is to visit any one of thousands of Web proxy sites such as Proxify, Guardster.com
and Proxy.org to call up banned sites without notice, according to filtering companies.").
174. See Clifford, supra note 9.
175. Id. ("If kids are searching for stuff, they often end up at porn, misinformation and
criminal sites.").
176. See supra note 55.
177. 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)( 11)-(12) (2006) (noting, additionally, that uniformity in regulation
was also essential to enforcement); see also Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Keynetics, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d
523, 531 (D. Md. 2006) (noting that the argument "that Internet commerce in general demands
consistent treatment and should only be regulated at the national level . . . while perhaps
interesting from an academic standpoint, it is clear that Congress itself, in enacting CAN-SPAM,
specifically reserved to the States ... authority to regulate certain aspects of Internet activity").
178. 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(12). But see 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(11) (addressing inconsistent state
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structure. Because of Utah's CPR, Congress and state legislatures may have
an example of a new regulatory method for dealing with unsolicited and
harmful electronic content. In the end, Utah's and Michigan's willingness to
take Congress up on its invitation to regulate "computer crimes," if proven
effective and constitutional, will show that the states are well-situated to
evaluate and meet the needs of their citizens by developing new parental
empowerment tools and innovative Internet regulations.
State experimentation is a basic tenet of federalism. 179 State laws have been
proven effective in remedying problems in many federal laws.' 80  In
recognition of this principle, deference to state power is common in federal
regulations of the Internet. 181  The role of states as laboratories for
experimentation with innovative solutions to new problems is most crucial
when fundamental rights are in direct opposition and the federal government
declines to act, as is the case with the non-existence of a national registry.
A. CPRs Strengthen the Reach of the CAN-SPAMAct
Utah's CPR not only complied with the CAN-SPAM Act, but also bolstered
the protective measures outlined in the Act.'8 2 Congress expressly recognized
the need for state participation in regulation of the Internet when it allowed
states to continue to regulate computer crimes. 183 Ultimately, Michigan andUtah merely exercised their power under the Court's long-standing recognition
179. See Prince & Shea, supra note 79, at 31-32 & n. 11 ("We all learned in eighth-grade
civics class that one of the strengths of our system of government is that it comprises fifty
'laboratories of democracy."'); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42-43 (2005) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (noting that "[t]he States' core police powers have always included authority to
define criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens," but
recognizing that conflicting federal legislation grants the power to "extinguish[] that experiment,
without any proof"); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the
nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country." (emphasis added)).
180. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 667-68 & n.6 (1995) ("State systems provide a laboratory for innovative
methods of controlling health care costs, and should, therefore, not be limited to one
methodology." (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-25, at 146-147 (1983))).
181. See 15 U.S.C. § 6504(a)(1) (2006) (providing for state attorney general enforcement of
COPA); see also Am. Booksellers Found. v. Strickland, 512 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1105 (S.D. Ohio
2007) (declining to adopt reasoning that all state regulation of the Internet violated the Commerce
Clause, and upholding a state statute used to prosecute sexual predators on the Internet); Quick
Pay, Inc. v. Stork, 509 F. Supp. 2d 974, 984 (D. Kan. 2007) (granting summary judgment to
defendants against plaintiffs claim that a Kansas regulation of out-of-state Internet payday
lenders violated the dormant commerce clause).
182. Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Shurtleff, No. 2:05CV949DAK, 2007 WL 922247, at *10 (D.
Utah Mar. 23, 2007).
183. See 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(11)-(12); Shurtleff 2007 WL 922247, at *10.
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of each state's "substantial interest in precluding the flow of obscene materials
even to consenting juveniles," in a state-specific manner.1 84
B. State-Run CPRs Alleviate the Concerns of the FTC's National Do-Not-
Email List
The Federal Trade Commission had "serious concerns about the security and
privacy risks inherent in any type of do-not-email registry."' 185 The FTC raised
concerns "that any registry 'that earmarked particular email addresses as
belonging to or used by children would raise very grave concerns and the
possibility that such a list could fall into the hands of the Internet's most
dangerous users, including pedophiles, is truly chilling. ' ' 186  The FTC's
primary concern was not the impact, or regulatory cost, that a registry would
have on the Internet, but rather the risk of exploitation of the registry.'87
Security concerns are noteworthy. However, just as "no amount of 'fatigue'
[or fear] should lead [the Court] to adopt a convenient 'institutional'
rationale-an absolutist, 'anything goes' view of the First Amendment-
because it will lighten [the Court's] burdens,"'' 88 nor should states quickly
surrender their right to protect the interests of their citizens. Utah recognized
its duty to protect its citizens against harmful electronic communications to
minors, despite the Court's broad interpretation of the First Amendment's
application to Internet speech in Reno,189 and won its first battle in Shurtleff by
defeating the Coalition's motion for a preliminary injunction.1 90
By acting, Utah has assumed its role as a "laboratory of experimentation" in
a way that will help protect its citizens and help federal lawmakers ascertain
the feasibility of a national CPR, while minimizing any potential risk. 191 By
keeping the registry on a state level, there are fewer names to protect, and
fewer inter-state issues in creating and maintaining the registry. Thus, Utah's
CPR mitigates the FTC's concern that the registry list could be compromised
by bad actors and used to target minors by implementing it at the state level.
192
184. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 107 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
185. FED. TRADE COMM'N, EFFECTIVENESS AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 119, at 40.
186. Id. (quoting FED. TRADE COMM'N, NATIONAL Do NOT EMAIL REGISTRY, supra note
120).
187. See id. at 25.
188. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 29 (1973).
189. See supra Part I.A.1.
190. Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Shurtleff, No. 2:05CV949DAK, 2007 WL 922247 (D. Utah
Mar. 23, 2007).
191. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country." (emphasis added)).
192. FED. TRADE COMM'N, EFFECTIVENESS AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 119, at 40.
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C. CPRs Transcend Nascent Technologies: A Contact Point, Regardless of
Innovation, Is Always a Contact Point
Assuming Utah's CPR is ultimately upheld against First Amendment
challenges, it will remain a viable law for many years to come because the
CPR's terms are flexible enough to apply to nascent and emerging
communications technologies.' 93 The CAN-SPAM Act targeted only email
and failed to use such adaptive statutory language.'
94
The CPR Act allows parents to protect against all types of harmful electronic
solicitations because it allows parents to register any "contact point,"
regardless of technology or method of delivery. 95 This could include the
current twenty-first century list of contact points, as well as the exponentially
massive list of twenty-second century contact points. The CPR's flexible
definitional scope minimizes the risk that the regulation will soon become
ineffective or obsolete as spammers and pomographers expand into the new
mediums of communication.
D. The CPR Helps Pornographers Avoid Prosecution
Perhaps the most ironic benefit of Utah's CPR is the ease with which
spammers may now "scrub" their online mailing lists.' 96 Historically, the adult
entertainment industry has claimed no intention to harm children, and that it
has gone to great lengths to protect minors from pornographic involvement or
consumption. 97 CPR compliance provides pornographers with a tool to carry
out its desire to protect minors while avoiding the potential cost of litigation, or
prosecution, for accidentally sending harmful material to minors.
IV. CONCLUSION
The CAN-SPAM Act and Utah's CPR Act provide a model for promoting
states' role as laboratories of experimentation that new federal laws should
follow, especially when it comes to the Intemet. As legislators, agencies, and
presidents evaluate the best way to regulate Internet content consistent with the
193. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-39-202 (2005 & Supp. 2008).
194. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7703, 7704 (2006).
195. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-39-202.
196. Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Shurtleff, No. 2:05CV949DAK, 2007 WL 922247, at *2 (D.
Utah Mar. 23, 2007).
197. D. Richards, Untangling Child Pornography From the Adult Entertainment Industry: An
Inside Look at the Industry's Efforts to Protect Minors, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 511, 518-19 (2008).
Pornographers have partnered with the "Association of Sites Advocating Child Protection
(ASACP), founded in 1996," which focuses on "eliminating child pornography from the Internet
... . What sets ASACP apart from the other organizations with similar missions is its
sponsorship" that "comes primarily from companies in the adult entertainment industry, including
powerful players like Hustler, Playboy, and Wicked Pictures. In a highly ironic twist, while adult
entertainment industry-funded ASACP is aiding law enforcement to stamp out child
pornography." Id. at 517-19.
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First Amendment while still protecting minors, they should remember that
states should have the ability to experiment and add to the legislative debate.
If Congress quashes the states' participation in the struggle to find the best way
to regulate the growing number of electronic communications media to which
children have access, the federal government will miss out on the valuable
feedback and experience that results from states acting as courageous
laboratories of experimentation.
258 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 59:231
